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Abstract
Migration from the European economies in transition is discussed on the bases of the research
carried out within the framework of the Global Development Network over the last four to five
years. Trade-offs between functionings and capabilities are traced in cases of voluntary and
involuntary migration as well as in the case of permanent and temporary migration. Various
causes and effects of migration are considered. Policy proposals end the paper. There is a
literature review in the appendix with the view to check the claims made in the public debate on
migration against the existing knowledge on that subject.
Keywords: transition countries, migration, labour markets, European integration.
The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that
presented in Human Development Reports.
1Introduction
There have been significant movements of people after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Most of it has
been for economic reasons and in that sense voluntary, but the Balkans, and other post-socialist
regions, have also produced significant amounts of political or forced migrations. After the
Eastern enlargement in 2004 and the beginning of the Balkan enlargement of the European Union
(EU) in 2007, migration has become important labor market issue in the EU too (see the
Appendix for a review of opinions and the literature). Finally, adverse economic expectations for
the next couple of years are bound to sharpen even more the policy debate on how to deal with
various aspects of inward and outward migration in all its forms. These issues have been and
continue to be intensely researched and debated.
Most of the research that is reported on here has been conducted in the framework of
cooperation of The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies and the Global
Development Network (GDN). Within GDN, wiiw acts as a hub for Southeast European
countries in transition and runs research competition on various development and transition
issues. Most, but not all, of those are connected with the ongoing Global Research Projects run by
GDN and some of those were addressing various migration issues. In addition to that, wiiw has
been studying migration flows from other countries in transition, mainly those from Central
Europe and the Baltic states. A selection of this research effort is reviewed and summarized
here.1
In this paper, after some preliminary remarks on the applicability of the capabilities
approach to human development to the issue of migration, the evidence on the flows of migrants
from Eastern and Southeastern Europe and the Baltics will be reviewed. The bulk of the paper
deals with the determinants of migration and of the labor market and other microeconomic and
macroeconomic effects of migration both on the sending and receiving countries. Policy
conclusions and recommendations close the paper.
                                                 
1 For a survey of other literature see Gligorov (2006) reproduced here as an Appendix.
2Capabilities and Functionings: The Trade-Off
One issue that emerges in the study of migration is of importance to human development
approach that relies on the theory of capabilities and assesses development, institutions,
allocation of resources and income and other relevant distributions on that basis.2 To see the issue
in the case of migration, one needs to distinguish between functionings and capabilities in the
usual way (Sen 1970, 1979, 1985, 1988; Fleurbaey, 2006, 2008). Functionings are specific beings
and doings that an individual can achieve, that can be measured in terms of individual utility or
welfare, while capabilities are defined as the ability to choose among different sets of
functionings, i.e., of different sets of beings and doings, which could be compared or assessed in
terms that are not necessarily summarized by some measure of individual or collective welfare.3
While functionings can be seen as the set of endowments and welfare that a person can have or
achieve, capabilities depend also on the choice set that a person has. The latter depends on the
combination of positive and negative freedoms (“freedom to” and “freedom from”) that are at
least in part supplied by social, cultural and political circumstances that individuals find
themselves in.
The way these concepts are defined, capabilities imply functionings in the sense that the
latter need to be available in order for a person to be able to choose that set of functionings that
utilizes to the full his or her capabilities. Clearly, the circumstances may be such that the
conditions for full utilization of one’s capabilities are not present. This may be because of the
specific social structure or because of political circumstances. One may still be able to achieve
high levels of functionings and indeed it is theoretically possible to achieve high levels of
individual functionings and even have low levels of inequality of functionings in a society,
though the freedom to exercise one’s capabilities is not available to everybody or to anybody and
consequently there is significant inequality in capabilities.
                                                 
2 No attempt is here made to review the voluminous literature on functionings and capabilities. For the purposes of
this paper, a rather general discussion of these concepts suffices. However, no simplification is involved.
3 It is essentially the Aristotelian idea that one diversifies one’s finctionings in order to fulfill one’s capabilities as a
person or a social being. The choice set includes alternative selves as well as welfare levels. Clearly, some
exogenous distribution of abilities is the constraining factor, though one has to assume that there is some degree of
flexibility that in turn depends on the social or overall distribution of capabilities and on the level of development
(e.g., on the system of education and on the income per capita or other similar indicators of development).
3An example that is pertinent to this paper is that of former socialist or communist
countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe and indeed in Asia too. Though the real levels of
inequality are not all that well represented in the assessments of income inequality in these
countries and also in the assessment of the human development indicators, it can be, for purposes
of this discussion, assumed that these were highly egalitarian societies, though people were
severely restricted in the use of their capabilities.4 In other words, there was, let us assume, low
inequality of functionings, but rather high depravation of capabilities, and probably high
inequality in terms of capabilities too. Thus, at least theoretically, it is conceivable that
capabilities could have been increased and the inequality in that sense also diminished without
the increase in the inequality of functionings, i.e., that there are no trade-offs between capabilities
and functionings during post-socialist transition (there is some evidence that this is indeed what
has happened in transition countries, though the differences among them are quite significant;
Gligorov 2008, Holzner and Leitner 2008).
The migrants from the transition countries, however, may be facing a choice between
capabilities and functionings.5 The choice may involve trade-offs both ways: capabilities may be
sacrificed to achieve a desired level of functionings and functionings may be diminished to
preserve certain capabilities. These choices may be present even if both capabilities and
functionings are increasing (i.e., when they are Pareto-improving) but not to the same extent, and
also when they are decreasing (i.e., when they are Pareto-inferior), but again not to the same
extent. For a simple way to see that capabilities may be sacrificed in order to secure certain
functionings, it is enough to assume that immigrants have limited citizenship rights, may face
different labor laws, may have problems with social integration and also suffer from the
disintegration of previous social ties, and may have higher costs due to cultural differences
between their native their immigrant countries.
For instance, most economic migrants make a choice of the first type: they give up some
capabilities in order to achieve certain functionings. Migrants are often motivated by higher
                                                 
4 This is an assumption purely for the sake of argument. In reality, neither functionings were maximized nor was
there the claimed equality. Sen in 1988 and elsewhere compares India and China in terms of these trade-offs between
some capabilities, that people in India enjoy, and some functionings, that people in China have an advantage in.
5 The trade-off between fnuctionings and capabilities is present quite generally and it is not faced only by migrants.
However, it is perhaps easier to see due to the specific legal, social and political position of the migrants. No claim is
made that there is anything unique to the choices that migrants make.
4incomes that they can earn by crossing the border and working in a foreign country. This
motivation may be strong enough to induce illegal migration as an extreme case. Clearly, moving
out of legality into illegality will normally reduce the capabilities of the individual. The trade-off
is present even in the case of legal migration, because of the restricted access to institutional,
political and social resources in the country of immigration: that legal, and every other, status of
the immigrant is different from that of the native population. Thus, many migrants trade
capabilities for functionings.
It may be different for political or involuntary migrants. To the extent that they can still
choose, they may be declining the opportunity to preserve their achieved level of functionings in
order not to give up on some of their capabilities. If the choice is to cooperate and give up dissent
or opposition in order to continue to function in the same way as before in one’s native country, a
person may choose, to the extent that there is a choice, to flee and to accept a lower level of
functionings in order to preserve at least some of the valuable capabilities. Thus, some
involuntary migrants may be trading off functionings for capabilities.
These trade-offs are present both in the cases when there is a Pareto-improvement in both
capabilities and functionings and where there is a move to a Pareto-inferior combination of
capabilities and functionings. An example of the former case is that of temporary migrants,
mostly skilled ones, who may improve their capabilities but increase their functioning even more.
The example of the latter, i.e., of Pareto-inferior trade-off, is perhaps the case of “modern slaves”,
that is of people who in the end experience a decrease in both capabilities and functionings, but
whose capabilities are even more severely constrained than functionings.
The discussion of these different cases is important not only from the point of view of the
clarity of research and interpretation, but also for drawing policy inferences and
recommendations. In the following, most of these cases will be discussed with the examples of
the research on migration from Central European and Southeast European and the Baltic
countries in transition or post-socialist countries.
5Migration Flows
Data on migration flows from Central and Southeastern Europe and the Baltics are not
necessarily very reliable, but those which are available do testify to relatively large migration to
more developed countries in the EU. This can be read out of Figures 1-6. They cover only the
period after the Eastern and Balkan enlargements in 2004 and 2007. Still, in Figure 6 the stock of
immigrants into EU-15 countries in 2007 is compared to the stock in 2004. The implication is
that immigration after transition countries have joined the EU has probably been larger than the
one that took place before. Also, that these have been large in terms of the population of the
sending countries, though not necessarily dramatically. As for the receiving countries, some have
received many more migrants than the others, but overall these numbers are not high for the EU
as a whole and also for most of the individual countries.
Figure 1
NMS-8 nationals residing in EU-156
change in stocks in thousand, 2004-2007
                                                 
6 NMS 8 are New Member States of the European Union that joined in 2004 (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia).
6Figure 2
NMS-8 nationals in total population of EU-15 countries
share in %, 2007
Source: Eurostat-LFS, wiiw calculations.
Figure 3
NMS-2 nationals residing in EU-15 7
change in stocks in thousand, 2004-2007
                                                 
7 NMS 2 are the New Member States that joined in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania).
7Figure 4
NMS-2 nationals in total EU-15 countries
share in %, 2007
Source: Eurostat-LFS, wiiw calculations.
Figure 5
NMS-10 nationals residing in EU-15 8
change in stocks in thousand, 2004-2007
                                                 
8 NMS 10 are NMS 8 plus NMS 2.
8Figure 6
NMS-10 migrants to the EU-15 in sending countries’ population
share in %, 2004, 2007
Source: Eurostat-LFS, wiiw calculations.
There are clearly differences when it comes to the origin of the migrants and the countries
that they go to. For instance, migrants from the two new member states from the Balkans
(Bulgaria and Romania) seem to prefer Spain, Italy and Greece, though they also go to the
countries that are preferred by the new member states from Central Europe and the Baltic
countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic
and Slovenia). Also, these two Balkan countries have seen more outward migration than most
other new member states. Though, outward migration from Latvia and Poland is also very high.
The picture is rather different in the other Balkan countries in transition (Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) as can be seen from
table 1. Though these countries are not member states of the EU and in a number of cases do not
have visa free regimes with the EU or with most other countries that are traditional destinations
for migrants from this region (e.g. USA, Canada, Australia), the level of outward migration is
higher or dramatically higher than in the new member states of the EU. Caution is necessary
when numbers of migrants from successor states of Yugoslavia are interpreted. The stock of
migrants is in most cases much larger, only some of the migrants have been granted citizenship in
EU or other countries, which probably accounts for relatively low numbers for Serbia, Croatia
and especially Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, it is not clear how migrants from Kosovo are
treated, which probably accounts for the sharp decline in the number of migrants from Serbia in
2004. In any case, former Yugoslavia countries have experienced outward migration since mid-
91960s and cannot be easily compared either to Bulgaria and Romania or to the quite striking case
of Albania. There is, however, no doubt about the importance of outward migration from the
Balkans.
Table 1
Population from Southeast European countries in the EU-15 by sending country,
numbers, and per cent of home-country population
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Albania 380,978 427,682 476,055 591,120 670,646 722,022 753,266 872,064
12.45% 13.91% 15.39% 19.00% 21.45% 22.98% 23.87% 27.56%
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
341,737 337,591 326,663 328,512 319,676 324,897 318,786 314,885
9.06% 8.88% 8.55% 8.57% 8.32% 8.46% 8.29% 8.19%
Croatia 304,066 306,452 324,005 336,967 323,121 322,001 321,335 314,881
6.80% 6.90% 7.29% 7.59% 7.27% 7.25% 7.23% 7.09%
Macedonia 86,795 104,440 105,679 136,577 143,693 153,749 162,144 145,888
4.28% 5.13% 5.20% 6.74% 7.07% 7.55% 7.95% 7.14%
Serbia 882,767 854,709 898,762 853,982 381,367 592,968 514,778 432,839
11.74% 11.39% 11.99% 11.42% 5.11% 7.97% 6.95% 5.86%
Bulgaria 58,489 83,384 166,913 200,412 227,987 265,764 285,698 309,749
0.72% 1.04% 2.12% 2.56% 2.93% 3.43% 3.71% 4.04%
Romania 180,927 230,444 283,607 461,381 602,039 764,616 930,430 1,096,6
64
0.81% 1.04% 1.30% 2.12% 2.78% 3.53% 4.31% 5.09%
Slovenia 29,339 29,947 31,922 33,642 33,504 33,712 34,307 32,616
1.48% 1.50% 1.60% 1.69% 1.68% 1.69% 1.71% 1.62%
Note: figures are based on different data sources due to availability.
Source: national statistics, Eurostat, LFS.
Thus, in general, it can be concluded that outward migration from transition countries in
Central, Southeastern Europe and the Baltics has been large and persistent. In some case, e.g.,
Albania, it has been quite dramatic. Of course, the extent of overall movements of people is not
captured by these figures due to the fact that there has been quite significant internal, i.e., intra-
Balkan migration due to violent conflicts that have produced large number of refugees and
internally displaced persons. In Table 2 the stock of refugee population is presented. In addition,
this is controlled for the level of development in terms of GDP at PPP (purchasing power parity)
per capita (the estimate is done on the full sample of countries as given by the World
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Development Indicators data source). Clearly, most post-socialist countries in Southeast Europe
have a surplus of refugee population compared to for example European countries or Austria in
particular.
Table 2
Refugee population, by country of asylum, in % of total population, 1999-2004
Average, 1999-
2004
Surplus, given GDP PPP
pc
Surplus difference to
Austria
Europe 0.41 - -
Austria 0.33 0.49 -
Albania 0.03 0.05 * -0.44
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
0.91 0.99 0.50
Croatia 0.33 0.36 -0.13
Moldova 0.00 0.00 * -0.48
Serbia-
Montenegro
4.50 4.39 3.90
Macedonia 0.32 0.40 * -0.08
Source: WDI 2007
Note: Surplus estimated using GLS, corrected for heteroskedasticity and panel
specific autocorrelation.
* Estimated surplus statistically not
significant.
In addition to these movements of population, intra-regional economic or voluntary
migration has been increasing in the Balkans in the last couple of years (DGECFIN and wiiw,
2008). The data is not reliable due to lack of clear regulation in some cases, but in general the
phenomenon can be only understated and not overstated.
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Determinants of Migration
Reasons for migration are complex (a recent survey of issues in Hanson 2008). When it comes to
economic or voluntary migration, it is to be expected that pull factors will dominate push factors.
This is often disputed with correlations between the changes in the levels of employment and
unemployment and the flows of migration (inward or outward). It is, however, not altogether
clear whether domestic labor markets can be seen as being quite independent from the world
markets or, for most of the cases discussed here, European labor markets. In some cases, there is
a tradition of outward migration so that levels of employment and unemployment in domestic
markets may be influenced by the changes in labor conditions in the markets that are traditionally
the major destinations of the migrants.
It may be useful, therefore, to go beyond the attempt to identify push and pull causes for
migration and perhaps look at the overall development of the labor markets, domestic and cross-
border alike. This seems especially warranted in the case of migrations that are prompted by
significant shocks to labor markets. This is the case, for instance, of the wave of outward
migration from Yugoslavia in mid-1960s, from Albania in early 1990s, and from the new
member states of the EU after 2004 and 2007. In all these cases, sudden liberalization of labor
markets has induced significant movements of people. In some cases, outward migration has been
massive. These liberalizations have, as a rule, been driven both by push and by pull factors.
For instance, in the case of Yugoslavia in the 1960s, high growth in Western Europe and
growing unemployment in Yugoslavia has coincided for liberalization of cross-border movement
of people to be acceptable to both sides (Woodward 1995). As a consequence, a massive one time
outward migration took place over a relatively short period of time. The changes that this round
of migration has brought about both to the receiving and the sending countries have been
significant and long-lasting. Similar effects may be expected from massive outward migration
from Albania (and Kosovo) and from several new member states too.
One effect is that migration may become endemic. An aspect of it will be discussed later.
Still, most of the Balkan countries, for instance, are traditionally migrant countries. In some
cases, this has been interrupted during the socialist period, but this has changed since the
beginning of transition. Similar traditional migrant habits and routes exist in central Europe and
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the Baltics. In these cases, it is not easy to separate push from pull factors even if those are rather
broadly defined.9
The identification of push and pull factors is additionally complicated by the fact that
migrants and native laborers are not necessarily substitutes but may complement each other. This
is where the relative endowment of skills across countries may play a significant role. Also,
differences in demography between sending and receiving countries may be quite important.
Thus, low skilled migrants may enable the receiving country to benefit from increased division of
labor while the sending country may experience a change of comparative advantages, e.g., from
that of abundance of unskilled labor to that of relatively greater supply of skilled one, and that
may be beneficial to its development.10
Fig. 7a Educational attainment of total population
Population aged 25-64, 2003
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
EU-10 NMS-7 NMS-8
Low
Medium (22)*
Medium (3+4 c)*
Medium (3+4 a,b)*
High
Notes: EU-10: BE, DK, EL, ES, FR, IRL, IT, LU, FI, UK; NMS-7: NMS-8 w/o PL.
*) Medium (22): ISCED 22: Secondary education shorter than 3 years; Medium (3+4 c): ISCED
31, 42: Secondary education programmes not designed to lead to high education level, lasting 3
years and more; Medium (3+4 a,b): ISCED groups 30, 32, 36, 41, 43: Secondary education
programmes designed to allow access to tertiary education ISCED stands for International
Standard Classification of Education from UNESCO.
                                                 
9 I am not aware of a good historical study of the migrations within and without Europe. Many studies of particular
countries or peoples exist. There is no point in this paper to review that literature. I think that it is not controversial
that many Eastern European nations have large diaspora in Western Europe and in immigrant countries oversees.
10 Again, this is a very general statement on issues that have received a lot of attention in the literature on migration.
These issues are of course controversial.
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Fig. 7b Educational attainment in total employment
Population aged 25-29, 2003
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
EU-10 NMS-7 NMS-8
Low
Medium (22)*
Medium (3+4 c)*
Medium (3+4 a,b)*
High
Notes: EU-10: BE, DK, EL, ES, FR, IRL, IT, LU, FI, UK; NMS-7: NMS-8 w/o PL.
*) Medium (22): ISCED 22: Secondary education shorter than 3 years; Medium (3+4 c): ISCED
31, 42: Secondary education programmes not designed to lead to high education level, lasting 3
years and more; Medium (3+4 a,b): ISCED groups 30, 32, 36, 41, 43: Secondary education
programmes designed to allow access to tertiary education
Thus, the skill composition of domestic and outside labor markets is important. In the
case of post-socialist countries, the skill composition is different than in the case of other migrant
regions, where unskilled labor predominates in the sending countries. In post-socialist countries
there is an abundance of skilled labor, at least if the skill distribution is conditioned on the level
of GDP (see Figures 7a and 7b for new member states). As a consequence, it can be expected that
both skilled and unskilled migrants will have somewhat different effects on both the receiving
and the sending countries or rather on their labor markets.
The situation in the Balkans may be somewhat different, though the data on secondary
and tertiary education do suggest that these countries probably have more educated labour force
than their level of GDP would warrant. The data, e.g., in Tables 4 and 5, do seem to suggest that
the supply of skilled workers is higher than the overall demand. In any case, these tables indicate
that there is probably a surplus in skilled labour given the level for development of these
countries (other indicators of development calculated in the same way can be found in Gligorov
2009).
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Table 4
Gross tertiary enrolment ratio, (ISCED 5 and 6), Total, 1999-2004
Average, 1999-
2004
Surplus, given GDP PPP
pc
Surplus difference to
Austria
Europe 47.9 - -
Austria 52.2 -19.0 -
Albania 16.6 6.9 25.9
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
18.7 15.5 34.6
Croatia 35.1 10.6 29.6
Moldova 33.8 30.8 49.9
Serbia-
Montenegro
36.6 23.0 42.1
Macedonia 25.1 10.6 29.6
Source: UNESCO
Note: Surplus estimated using GLS, corrected for heteroskedasticity and panel
specific autocorrelation.
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Table 5
Gross secondary enrolment ratio, 1999-2004
Average, 1999-
2004
Surplus, given GDP PPP
pc
Surplus difference to
Austria
Europe 101.1 - -
Austria 99.6 90.1 -
Albania 75.4 74.2 -15.90
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
87.7 85.5 -4.60
Croatia 86.6 83.2 -6.92
Moldova 82.6 82.3 -7.78
Serbia-
Montenegro
90.0 88.4 -1.68
Macedonia 83.9 81.8 -8.28
Source: WDI 2007
Note: Surplus estimated using GLS, corrected for heteroskedasticity and panel
specific autocorrelation.
Finally, the demographic factors play a role. In most other regions, sending countries tend
to be young and receiving countries tend to be old. In this region, i.e., in Central Europe and the
Balkans this is not the case for the most part. The only real exception is the Albanian population
(not only in Albania, but in Kosovo, Macedonia, and in other countries where they are a
minority). This has significant consequences for the flow of remittances, for their use and for
fiscal systems in both the receiving and the sending countries. Migrants from Central Europe and
the Balkans do not necessarily help either the demographics of the receiving countries or that of
the sending countries, and thus do not necessarily have the expected both positive and negative
effects on the fiscal burden and sustainability in both sets of countries.
Many studies of migration in this region, especially in the Balkans, have been concerned
with the flow of remittances and with their role as determinants of migration. Out of quite a
number of hypothesis that have been advanced to explain the high levels of remittances, one that
seems to do better than the others is that remittances are repayments for investments in the
migrants (Wolf et al, 2008). One interpretation could be that families invest in migrants who then
repay the debt by remitting part of their income. Remittances then are substitutes for the
16
deficiencies in the financial markets and in the fiscal systems. They are not very different from
intra-family or intra-ethnic borrowing and lending activities and all the other types of investment
activities.11
Apart from economic migration, political or involuntary migration continues to play a role
in the Balkans. This type of migration presents additional problems. Closely related to such
migrants as refugees, asylum seekers or displaced people are also those who rely on human
trafficking for reasons of joining illegal migrants or because of the existence of high barriers to
migration. These latter cases are tricky in the sense that they are clearly involuntary in a
counterfactual sense, i.e., those who make use of facilitators of human trafficking would
presumably prefer to migrate legally if they could, but are voluntary in the sense of revealed
preference, at least at some point in the process of migration. In the case of the Balkans, political,
forced or involuntary migration is still rather important as is human trafficking and generally the
use of illegal immigration into countries of destination.
Remittances and Migration
There has been growing interest in the flows and different effects of remittances that migrants
send back home. Studies abound on microeconomic and macroeconomic impact of remittances
especially in the countries where they play a very important role. Out of the set of countries under
consideration in this paper, some countries in the Balkans are perhaps more interesting than most
others. As can be seen in table 6, remittances tend to be very important in a number of Balkan
countries, e.g., in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Romania. In addition, Serbia is one of
the countries with highest inflow of remittances and data for Macedonia is suspect because some
recent estimates indicate that remittances play a much larger role than it can be determined from
the balance of payments data. To get a sense of the importance of remittances, it can be perhaps
pointed out that in most of the countries mentioned above they are higher than foreign direct
investments. Thus, remittances are quite crucial for these economies.
The determinants of the amount of remittances are not all that well understood. One issue
is how are they connected with the migration flows? In other words, is outward migration
                                                 
11 For the strategy for testing alternative hypothesis of motivations to remit see detailed discussion in Wolf et al.
(2008).
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motivated by the need to earn money and remit back home? In the case of endemic migration,
that is in the cases when outward migration has a long history, it is natural to hypothesize that
remittances are a (and perhaps the) motivating factor for the decision to migrate out of the
domestic labor market. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that these are long term
phenomena, which means that they have become endogenous to the overall structure of economic
activity.
Table 6
Workers’ remittances and compensation of employees in the countries
of Southeast Europe, debits and credits as share of GDP, 2000 to 2006
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Workers' remittances,
credits
Albania 12.41 12.12 12.92 17.39 21.72 21.93 20.33
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
16.00 13.86 13.72 18.77 20.66 19.35 17.76
Croatia 2.47 2.35 2.61 3.43 3.69 3.36 2.53
Macedonia 1.91 1.59 2.18 4.00 4.62 4.50 4.91
Bulgaria n.a. 2.37 2.85 4.34 2.73 2.62 2.04
Romania 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 5.87 7.11
Slovenia 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.02
Compensation of employees,
credits
Albania 1.57 1.66 1.81 2.47 2.79 2.44 3.18
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
10.64 8.77 7.75 9.76 8.91 8.20 7.18
Croatia 0.38 0.57 0.68 1.06 1.44 1.43 1.87
Macedonia 0.01 0.13 0.32 0.77 1.49 1.52 1.71
Bulgaria 0.39 2.50 3.86 6.61 8.05 6.54 6.44
Romania 0.21 0.22 0.27 0.24 0.23 1.49 1.49
Slovenia 0.81 0.72 0.77 0.97 1.15 1.12 1.13
Workers' remittances, debits
Albania n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.00 0.00 n.a. 0.00
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
n.a. -0.08 -0.09 -0.16 -0.75 -0.40 -0.53
Croatia -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10
Macedonia -0.34 -0.48 -0.53 -0.42 -0.42 -0.37 -0.39
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.11 -0.12 -0.10
Romania n.a. 0.00 n.a. 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Slovenia 0.00 n.a. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Compensation of employees,
debits
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Albania . . . -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 -0.46
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
-0.04 -0.09 -0.11 -0.17 -0.20 -0.18 -0.17
Croatia -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.17 -0.18 -0.14 -0.14
Macedonia . . -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05
Bulgaria -0.18 -0.16 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.13
Romania -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05
Slovenia -0.12 -0.11 -0.18 -0.29 -0.36 -0.40 -0.52
Sources: wiiw annual database (GDP), IMF balance of payments statistics (remittances).
The flows of remittances have been analyzed with the aim to answer different questions.
Because of the long term nature of outward migration from former Yugoslavia countries, they
provide for an interesting case in this respect. A number of studies have been conducted to gauge
the determinants and the effects of remittances in this group of countries. Perhaps the most
interesting paper is that by Jovicic and Dragutinovic (2006). In that paper, they present evidence
of the flow of remittances in these countries and analyze their behavior as a consequence of the
labor market developments and over the business cycle. Out of a rich set of findings, three may
be more interesting than others.
Table 7
Estimated model of remittance determinants in the SEE
- Dependent variable: Remittances per capita
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First, they find that the state in the domestic labor markets influences the decision to
emigrate; in other words, a decline in employment or an increase in unemployment influences the
flow of emigration. In that sense, it is the push factor that is more important overall. Other factor
that was found to be important is the state of integration onto the EU: D0 is no contract with the
EU, D1 is association agreement and D2 is accession negotiations (these are dummy variables:
remittances decline with integration. Table 7 presents the results for Southeast European
countries as a whole.
Second, remittances behave counter-cyclically: the inflow increases if domestic economy
does worse and decreases if it improves. This suggests that remittances are mostly used to
support consumption of family members back home. This motivation changes at higher levels of
GDP per capita. In table 7 the sign for Croatia, which is a significantly more developed country
than the rest in the sample, is different than for the other countries with lower GDP per capita.
That is perhaps an indication that once countries are more developed the use of remittances
changes: they are more often invested rather than consumed. This study does not provide a
definite confirmation for such an explanation, however. Further research of the use of remittances
in relatively better off countries would be needed to check whether this indeed the case.
Table 8
The estimated model of remittance inflow as a dependent variable
Tables 8 and 9 show the results for Serbia only. These tables report VAR estimates that
show some habit formation, as Jovicic and Dragutinovic interpret their findings, so that the flow
of remittances depends rather strongly on previous inflows of remittances. Also, consumption,
and especially imports of consumer goods show stability over time in addition to being dependent
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on remittances.  This stability of consumption and its dependence on the continuous inflow of
remittances imply that remittances work counter-cyclically.  This is also supported by the fact
that in Serbia, and indeed throughout countries in transition, currency substitution is quite high,
so that consumption and savings are being protected if significant shares of income are
denominated in foreign currency, which certainly remittances are.
Table 9
The model of consumer goods imports as the dependent variable
Third, the increase of remittances goes together with trade deficits (Figure 8 shows that
for Serbia).
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Figure 8
Trade deficit and remittance inflows in million of US dollars
This is, as Jovicic and Dragutinovic explain, both because of microeconomic and
macroeconomic reasons. High inflow of remittances tends to strengthen the exchange rate of the
domestic currency thus supporting the services sector rather than the exporting sector. In
addition, higher amount of remittances pushes the price level and the wage rate up which has
unfavorable consequences for the labor market, which in turn make outward migration attractive
and in the next step support the steady inflow of remittances.
These three effects together tend to support structural problems in the labor markets and
those in turn support higher levels of outward migration, at least in the case of former Yugoslavia
and in Serbia in particular.
Labor market effects of remittances have been studied extensively in other countries too.
A recent study looks at the effects on labor vs. leisure trade-off in Albania (Narazani, 2008).
Utilizing LSMS (living Standard Measurement Survey) the study finds that once remittances are
sizeable, they induce preference for leisure over work in employees. The effect is nonexistent for
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self-employed people. This also suggests that remittances may have supported formal economy
less than the informal one on the assumption that most of those who are self-employed participate
in the informal economy. These results for Albania are reported as follows:
Table 10: Male Labour Supply Behaviour by Remittances
Deciles (50% increase of remittances)
Wage employee Self-employed
Remitances
Deciles M0 M1 M0 M1
I 32.61348 32.61282 46.6237 46.62381
II 27.55036 27.54493 46.14353 46.14584
III 28.87537 28.85627 47.50375 47.50652
IV 30.19125 30.15541 48.73935 48.75917
V 30.5533 30.50384 47.85358 47.86404
VI 30.36687 30.23003 48.59375 48.58953
VII 28.10178 27.87871 45.12634 45.27331
VIII 29.74043 29.44362 49.85564 50.07621
IX 32.51592 31.89286 46.94759 47.40201
X 34.79727 30.76408 47.86826 51.16745
Note: M0 refers to baseline model,
M1 refers to simulated model  
“Tables 10-12 indicate that an increase of 50% in remittances, other things being equal,
will affect negatively the labour supplies of both men and a woman in case they are wage
workers while a reverse effect is observed in case they are self employed.
The negative effect of remittances on labour supply is not new in the migration literature.
Nevertheless, these tables indicate that this impact is noticeable only for sizeable amounts of
remittance share in individual income and especially in the last remittance deciles (in case of
women 43% for dependant worker and 33% for self-employed, while in case of men 28% in case
of dependant worker and 37% for self-employed). Table 12 indicates that male labour supply is
more elastic to remittance than that of female. Several studies prove that male labour supply
elasticity to non-labour income (such as remittances) outnumbers female labour supply while the
reverse trend is observed in case of responses to wage changes.”
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Table 11: Female Labour Supply Behaviour by Remittances
Deciles (50% increase of remittances)
Wage employee Self-employed
Remitances
Deciles M0 M1 M0 M1
I 11,65535 11,65287 52,29045 52,28836
II 9,119665 9,105733 43,74645 43,7582
III 11,87772 11,84187 43,79152 43,83835
IV 13,89162 13,84811 52,4006 52,45588
V 10,71529 10,6642 46,76595 46,81461
VI 11,46077 11,35102 48,09008 48,12782
VII 12,65334 12,52649 45,80028 46,01454
VIII 10,26164 9,992486 42,48617 42,84985
IX 12,0005 11,66052 42,3474 42,59697
X 9,220448 9,07694 42,68828 45,97343
Note: M0 refers to baseline model,
M1 refers to simulated model
 
The study takes the next step to simulate the possible effects of the introduction of a flat
tax on labor supply. The expectation is that the lowering of the income taxes will at least partly
neutralize both the incentive to exit the labor market for the recipients of sizeable income support
from remittances and also to decrease the incentive to work in the informal economy in order to
evade taxes.
These findings may be unique to Albania because of the high disutility of paid
employment and very high share of informal economy. Given that most of the Albanian firms are
very small, with one or two people employed, relatively high inflow of remittances is supportive
of the type of business that these micro firms are engaged in. Formal employment as a rule means
working for the government, which may not provide for as profitable opportunities to earn money
as the informal sector does. These characteristics may not be typical for other Balkan or transition
countries. However, they may be relevant for developing countries because Albania is in
economic and demographic terms more of a development than transition economy.
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Table 12: Labour Supply elasticities with respect to remittances by
gender and disposable income deciles
Male Female
Disposable
Income
Deciles
Wage
employee Self-employed
Wage
employee Self-employed
I -0,0000314 7,82E-06 -0,00042 -0,0000535
II -0,0001716 9,63E-05 -0,00347 0,0005524
III -0,0008296 0,000101 -0,00614 0,0021702
IV -0,0017062 0,000874 -0,00935 0,0024998
V -0,0017316 0,000524 -0,01054 0,0022834
VI -0,0069151 7,41E-05 -0,02326 0,0019825
VII -0,0117537 0,006108 -0,02386 0,0095027
VIII -0,0136148 0,009086 -0,05397 0,0184127
IX -0,0331869 0,020447 -0,07046 0,0131285
X -0,1964374 0,179482 -0,17188 0,1446428
Skill Acquisition and Migration
Transition countries do not suffer from scarcity of skills. In fact, the employment structure shows
labor markets’ preference for skilled labor. Indeed, among those unemployed, unskilled workers
are mostly to be found. Irrespective of that fact, one finds large number of skilled people among
the migrants. The natural explanation is that people with skills are motivated to migrate because
of the significant difference in wages between the sending and the receiving countries. In
addition, it is, as a rule, easier to immigrate if one has skills than if one is unskilled. Finally, it
may be the case that the trade-off between capabilities and functionings is lower for skilled than
for unskilled people. The reason for this difference is due to the higher social and legal
opportunities that skilled persons usually have. They usually find it easier to integrate socially
and also have easier time if they decide to naturalize. These advantages increase their capabilities
or, to put it differently, they have to sacrifice less of relevant capabilities for the improved
functionings that they achieve by emigrating.
This raises an interesting question about the incentives to return if a gap between wages in
the sending and receiving countries is narrowed? One way to address this question is to look at
the wages that a skilled person can get before and after he or she has spent some time abroad. In a
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study of the wage effects of return migration in Romania (Iara 2006), it was found that indeed
those who have spent some time abroad can expect to fetch a higher wage once they decide to
return.
This could be interpreted in a number of ways. It may just reinforce the preference for
skilled labor which is anyway present. The entrepreneurs may judge that a skilled person
returning to the home labor market may have upgraded his or hers skills during their stay abroad.
As the demand for skilled labor is anyway high, marginal premium on skill may also be
significant.
A competing explanation may be that high outflow of skilled people leads to higher
wages for those who remain in the skilled labor market and higher wages for return migrants may
just indicate that they are wage setters in that particular market. It takes a higher wage to induce a
skilled person to return back and that difference will eventually be erased as this marginal wage
will determine the overall wage in that particular market. This process will stop once wages on
the domestic market are equal to those in the outside market (not nominally but in some
meaningful sense to include the difference in the price levels and many other determinants of
labor preferences).
This analysis is based only on Romanian data. It is tempting to generalize the findings to
the whole region, but the data is not available. There also may be a difference between countries
that are members of the EU, or where on the way to becoming member states, and countries
outside of the EU. The reason perhaps has to do again with constraints on capabilities. A less
developed country that is inside the EU or is going to join the EU presents its citizens with
different choices than a citizen of a country outside of the EU may face. So, the trade-off between
functionings and capabilities may be lower for citizens of countries that are inside the EU.
Return Migration in General
What has been said about skilled migrants and the effects of their return on wages does not
necessarily extend to unskilled migrants. The demand for their labor services at home is low and
the evolving structure of the transition economies does not seem to indicate that there is much of
complementarity between unskilled and skilled workers. Indeed, industries with low skilled
26
workers are disappearing and the services sector cannot quickly absorb all the unskilled people
looking for work.
In a recent study on the return migrants from Bulgaria (Mintchev and Boshnakov, 2006),
it was found that a sizeable amount of Bulgarian emigrants take jobs in EU member states such as
Spain and Greece.  They rely on a survey of return migrants and find that their main motivation is
to earn money and bring it home rather than anything else. They summarize their main findings
thus:
“The assessment of migration experience as well as the main remittances usage and their
impact on the economic status of Bulgarian households provides background for the following
conclusions:
- The survey findings show that roughly 15% of Bulgarian households (over 400
thousand) have participated in international migration process in the period
2001-2005. The total number of return migrants is estimated at over 400
thousand and the number of persons currently staying abroad respectively at
over 200 thousand.
- Men prevail among return migrants (over two third), as well as married
persons up to 45 years of age; the majority of respondents (80%) have at least
secondary education.
- Preferences for South-European destinations are found (almost half of return
migrants) where short-term migration predominates. About one fourth of
respondents had jobs in agriculture, each sixth in transport and each seventh in
tourism as well as in construction. Although mass Bulgarian emigration is
engaged in 3-d jobs unattractive for the local labor force, return migrants
believe that their work was qualified. As a whole they feel satisfied with their
stay abroad.
- The vast majority of Bulgarian return migrants had spent less than half of their
earnings; besides, about half of respondents had spent abroad less than one
fourth of the earnings received. No significant difference was found in the
shares of expenditures between male and female migrants and, surprisingly,
between migrants returned from different European regions. The amount of
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remittances is related mainly to the educational level as well as to gender
(women are less paid) and age (more experienced migrants are better
remunerated).
- Remittances to Bulgarian households are used mainly for consumption but also
in „non-altruistic” (profit-oriented) purposes. It was found that about one in
five households that have received transfers from abroad run own businesses
while this share is twice lower for the other families. Remittances have
significant positive net impact on Bulgarian households’ well-being – the
substantially higher relative share of families with monthly income over 800
BGN (409 EUR) among return migrant households is indicative of the fact.
- Private transfers to individuals cover one fifth of the trade deficit and reach
one third of foreign direct investments inflow in the country. In this respect,
remittance behavior plays an important role for the macro-economic stability
of Bulgarian economy. However, the official bank reporting system records
less than half of the actual amount of remittances inflow. It is confirmed by the
fact that more than half of return migrant households used to receive funds
mainly in cash.
The survey findings indicate the existence of a persistent orientation of migration
outflows from a new emigration country like Bulgaria to the new immigration countries of South
European EU tier. Thus, Bulgarian policy is facing the dilemma whether to contain or, to the
contrary, to liberalize the cross-border (particularly short-term) mobility. There is no doubt
however that the political elite of the economies in transition of South-Eastern Europe should
take increasingly into account existing migration practices and attitudes.”
Even for temporary emigration, costs may be non-negligible. Figure 9 gives the
distribution of costs found in the Bulgarian study.
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Figure 9. Distribution of respondents by the amount of funds spent for financing their
departure (EUR)
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As for the satisfaction in the job, the Bulgarian data seem to indicate that qualified job and
one that goes with a legal contract is preferable (see Table 13). Again, if these findings were to be
interpreted in terms of the trade-off between capabilities and functionings, it seems to be the case
that satisfaction increases if that trade-off is smaller and decreases if it is really just functionings
that the motive and the reward for outward migration This interpretation is tentative an
suggestive because the research that is reported on here was not designed to answer that question
or to test such a hypothesis.
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Table 13. Satisfaction of return migrants
Are you satisfied by your stay abroad
regarding your professional advance?Personal assessment of
main job characteristics Yes,
completely
Yes, in some
extent
No Total
Full-time job:              No
Yes
33.3
36.5
41.7
45.9
25.0
17.6
100.0
100.0
Qualified job:              No
Yes
19.0
51.9
47.6
44.2
33.3
3.8
100.0
100.0
Official contract:         No
Yes
28.8
44.7
44.2
48.9
26.9
6.4
100.0
100.0
Average monthly
earnings (EUR)
1196.26 1091.39 789.05 1074.0
Clearly, the aim of outward migration is to maximize the remittances. Those are used to
improve the functionings of the return migrant as well as of the family. The decision to migrate
does involve some sacrifice of capabilities, albeit temporal, because these are return migrants. It
can be hypothesized that this type of migration will diminish once the economy in the home
country solves its structural problems in the labor market.
Temporary Migration
In a number of countries, temporary migration and indeed commuter migration plays a significant
role. Workers in Slovakia, Poland, and Romania as well as in many other countries cross the
border to do temporary work in a neighboring country and often commute daily. Many of these
are illegally employed or are working in the informal market. These migrants tend to worry the
authorities in the receiving countries because they may have important influence on the wages
and employment in the border regions. On the positive side, they do not as a rule qualify to use
public resources and tend to pay taxes (indirect ones in the case of informal employment). They
do spend most their money at home, which is the case with remittances in general. That amounts
to increased imports from the sending countries.
In an interesting study on temporary migration from Poland into Germany (Micevska,
Sazcuk and Stark 2007) it was found that temporary migrants, who present a sizeable part of total
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outward migration from Poland due to the way temporary migration is regulated in Germany, do
not tend to assimilate socially or otherwise. In a way, they keep their capabilities fixed and
connected with their country of origin while working abroad in order to improve their and the
functionings of their families.
In another study on the effects of outward migration on one town in Romania (Pop 2006),
it was found again that perhaps the main objective of emigration has been higher earnings with
the aim to spend them at home. The relatively large inflow of remittances has had a sizeable
effect on the local economy. The question that is asked is whether that has led to development of
this particular town or not? The main finding is that the answer depends on the policies adopted
nationally and locally. High inflow of remittances may distort incentives to work and also favor
consumption over investments. There is a clear case for policy intervention in order to restore
proper incentives for work and investments so that migration can be a vehicle for growth and
development.
Economic Impact on Sending and Receiving Countries
There is large literature on the impact of migration on the receiving countries (see Appendix).
There are fewer studies, at least when it comes to this region, on the effects of migration on the
sending countries. This is partly due to the lack of data and also to lack of concern on the part of
the sending countries because they are as a rule facing a rather worrisome state in their respective
labor markets.
 Most of the studies on the effects of immigration on receiving economies have been
concerned with effects on wages and on public spending. When it comes to the immigration from
transition countries into EU, the effects are essentially negligible if the EU as a whole is
considered. The inflows are too small to make much of a difference either to wages or to
employment in the EU as a whole. Even if immigration were to be much larger, the effects would
be for all practical purposes negligible.
That is not necessarily true for each individual country. Some countries have received
more immigrants than the others. In those countries, e.g., in Great Britain, Sweden and Ireland,
the impact has been studied rather carefully. Most studies have hard time finding significant
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negative effects of inward migration. There is some evidence that wages have been depressed for
unskilled work and that some substitution of immigrant for domestic employment has taken place
in for instance Great Britain. On the positive side, there are arguments that immigration has been
conducive to price stability and thus to lower interest rates and as a consequence has supported
higher rates of investment. Overall, the effects have to be judged to have been positive.
Much debate has been stirred by the argument that there are immigrants who are not
really looking for jobs but are “welfare shopping”. And even if they are employed, they take
more from public spending then they put into public revenues. There is hardly any thorough
study of this issue, however. The theoretical debate is also inconclusive because the effects
depend on a number of assumptions about the future state of affairs that cannot be checked
against any data at the moment. The governments seem to have come to the conclusion that they
should prefer high skilled immigrants who decide to settle for a limited period of time. So, they
pay taxes at progressive rates and return home before using health and other higher cost public
services. Similarly, governments are ready to accept unskilled or people with lower qualifications
if they do not bring their families along and if they stay only for a specified period o time.
It is not clear that this approach to immigration really makes sense. The main fiscal
problem in the EU member states is that of sustainability due to the fact that the population is
ageing and the health costs and the dependency rations are increasing. Thus, there may not be
revenues to sustain spending on health care and pensions in the long run. To the extent that
immigrants are younger than the native population and especially if the tend to have more
children, growing population through immigration would be beneficial to the sustainability of the
fiscal systems in the receiving countries. Though this argument has been made, it has not had the
needed policy impact so far.
When it comes to the impact of outward migration on the sending countries, the main
interest has been on the effects of migration on skill composition of the labor force and on the
microeconomic and macroeconomic impact of remittances. Some of the latter have already been
discussed. The former issue is somewhat more difficult to assess. There have been relatively few
studies of the determinants of the structure of labor markets in countries in transition. In a recent
study (DGECFIN and wiiw, 2008), it has been argued that low employment and high
unemployment in the Balkan countries is mostly the consequence of structural characteristics and
32
are much less influenced by the flexibility of the labor markets. There is any number of structural
disequilibria in the labor markets in this region. This can be seen easily from the structure of the
unemployed. The highest rates of unemployment are among the long term job seekers, among the
unskilled, among the young and among women (the latter especially in Albania, Kosovo and
Macedonia). This means that older people who have lost their jobs or young people who have
never had a job and do not have the needed skills – have virtually no chance to get a job.
Similarly, in some countries, the labor participation of women is extremely low.
Outward migration may be an answer for young unskilled people, but not for older
workers and for most women. For the young and for those without skills, domestic market is just
too small – in terms of demand for labor. Thus the choice for these types of workers is to depend
on one or the other type of welfare support or to seek employment abroad. Given that there is low
demand for their labor services as it is, the impact on the labor market of this type of outward
migration should be small. The impact on fiscal balances is of course very positive.
When it comes to the skilled workers, the issue of brain drain emerges. In the case of the
countries considered here, it is to be understood that the situation is rather different than in a
typical developing economy. The reason is that the level of GDP in these countries is still low
given their endowment of skills. This is because of the dramatic decline of GDP in the early years
of transition and the continuing low level of employment even after years of high growth. And in
the Baltics and to the even higher extent in the Balkans, this gap is still very large. Therefore,
outward migration of skilled people may not be suboptimal. They are not the scarce resource in
most of these countries. That is reflected in the relatively high difference in wages for skilled
labor in these countries and in the more developed EU countries.
Thus, outward migration does not as a rule have negative consequences for the sending
countries in this group in any case.
Migration and Inequality
The countries considered here do not display high levels of inequality. Some are quite egalitarian,
while most of them have Gini-coffeicients that are not different from those in the more developed
countries of the EU (for overall developments see figure 8). Transition countries further to the
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east are significantly more unequal and this is even more the case in the most migrant developing
countries. This is to a large extent consequence of relatively high levels of public spending and
other indirect policies of redistribution. Thus, it is hard to argue that it is absolute deprivation or
lack of equality of capabilities that drives outward migration.
How about relative inequality? In a study by Stark and Micevska (2008), it is found that
Polish temporary migrants are motivated by relative poverty, i.e., inequality, rather than absolute
poverty. It seems to be the case that migrants are as a rule to be found among the people who are
poorer than their reference group. It is tempting to argue that there are certain social pressures
that incite people that are doing worse than those they compare themselves with to migrate in
order to improve their functionings. Whether that is the correct interpretation, it is not possible to
say on the basis of this study.
It seems, however, to be the case that these migrants do no compare themselves with the
people in the receiving countries but with those in their country of origin. This even in the case
when they have been temporary migrants for quite a while, that is when they have renewed their
temporary working permit, which is for three months, many times over. They are interested in
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functionings in the country they work in and not in enlarging their capabilities even if they for all
practical purposes live in the new country. Their relative inequality with the native workers does
not determine their decisions to go or stay or to work or not, but it is their reference group at
home that seems to influence this decision. This is certainly an interesting and further research
may clarify the influence of relative poverty or of inequality on labor market decisions further.
Forced Migration
Most of the studies are about voluntary migration, though the voluntariness of the decision needs
to be defined carefully. In the case of some countries in transition, e.g., those in the Balkans,
involuntary or forced migration plays a very significant role. In these cases also the meaning of
the term involuntary needs to be defined rather carefully.
The attempt has been made in the study on involuntary migration in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The country was experiencing a war and a civil war between 1992 and 1995. Large
displacement of people occurred. Also, there were large number of refugees and internally
displaced people. There were also a significant number of political refugees, i.e., people who
were running away from all the parties in conflict, who were running away from the conflict
simply. The question asked in this study (Oruc, 2008) is do their individual characteristics
explain where they end up? In particular, does the difference in education or in skills determine
where one ends up as a refugee, as a displaced person or as a citizen?
The theoretical assumption is that people do involuntarily resettle, but that they have a
choice as to where and in which way they resettle. That means that even if capabilities are very
restricted, and one is tempted to say that a person is being simply coerced into a decision, there is
still some choice of the set of functionings that he or she can make. One finding is that the scope
for choice increases with the level of education. People with skills have more of a choice than
those without skills. The choice set varies also with other characteristics, e.g., gender, age, health
and probably many others.
The other example of the same issue and the same ambiguity is brought about in a study
on “modern slavery” in the Balkans (Shima, 2008). The question is whether the restrictions to
immigration into EU countries support human trafficking from the Balkans? A number of
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countries in the Balkans and more broadly in Eastern Europe face steep visa restrictions to
travelling into the EU countries. Thus, they have to find facilitators who will get them into the
country they want to go to. This story starts with a choice but ends into an involuntary labor
contract. The marginal, i.e., individual outcomes, are not the same and do depend on the
characteristics of this modern slaves, who are mostly women.
Thus, there is some room to refine the distinction between voluntary and involuntary
migration and to analyze the full complexity of the trade off between capabilities and
functionings that people have or make.
Policy Issues
This paper reports only on a limited number of studies, though they are representative, on issues
connected with migration from countries that have in the meantime joined the EU and other EU
countries or from the Balkans into the EU. Mostly economic aspects have been discussed, though
social and other issues have been touched upon. The key policy conclusions that can be drawn
from this body of research should probably include the following ones:
Migration involves a trade off between capabilities and functionings. In most cases of
economic migration, capabilities are sacrificed in order to maximize functionings. This is not
inherent in the labor market mobility but in the policy decisions to restrict capabilities of inward
migrants. This has quite a number of negative consequences both for the migrants and for the
native population. The main being that the inequality in capabilities breeds negative social and
political consequences, some of which are evident in a number of countries with large migrant
populations. The obvious policy conclusion is to work on the equality of capabilities of both
migrants and the citizens of the receiving countries. A few years back, there were some
promising proposals along these lines, but those have been pushed aside because of the growth
anti-immigrant sentiments in the EU member states. I have in mind the proposals and even some
legislation in some countries to grant rights that usually go with citizenship to migrants. Also,
there were attempts to work for socially inclusive institutions within increasing diversity. The
ideas of voting rights for migrants in local elections were floated around and also the project of
building multicultural societies was popular. Recent developments have been in the opposite
36
direction. Thus, migration has been more about functioning than about capabilities really. Indeed,
the policy approach seems to be that one way to increase barriers to immigration is to increase the
price in terms of capabilities a migrant has to pay to resort to migration with the aim of
improving their functionings.
The existing restrictions are designed in such a way to maximize the benefits of the native
population and to push most of the costs on the immigrants. This is mostly counterproductive.
There is a tendency, recently adopted by the House of Lords of Great Britain, to assess the
welfare impact of immigration only in terms of the welfare effects on the native population and to
disregard the welfare improvements of or costs to the immigrants. This is morally unacceptable
and makes no economic sense also. The costs of discrimination cannot be born only by the
immigrants but will have external social effects that are highly undesirable from the welfare point
of few. The point may be made by a comparison between the EU and the USA. Many studies
show (see some references in the Appendix) that social segregation that is more prominent in the
EU than in the USA has social costs for the native population and not only for the migrants. In
the most general manner, one can argue that the increase of diversity that migrants bring
increases potentially capabilities of the native population but only if social inclusion is possible.
Otherwise, the costs in terms of capabilities fall on both the native and the immigrant population,
though arguably more on the latter than on the former.
In the case of the migrations from Central European, Southeast European countries and
the Baltics, there have been relatively minor negative consequences usually identified with the
brain drain or with the wage and employment effect on labor markets of both the sending and the
receiving countries. This is mostly because of the specific characteristics of these countries and
their experience cannot be immediately transplanted to the developing countries. However, even
in the cases that very much resemble developing countries, e.g., in the Balkans, the experience so
far has been rather positive. In that context, it is hard to understand the slow pace of the
introduction of freedom to move to people of these areas.
The negative effects of migration are almost invariably connected with the immigration
policies on the part of the receiving countries that tend to push the costs on the migrants.
Particularly damaging have been restrictions that have supported the development of informal
markets and of growing practice of illegal migration. Most of the existing restrictions make no
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sense especially because there is clearly a strong pull influence due to unfavorable demographic
and fiscal developments in the EU.
Finally, most of the research points to the significant role that policy can play in order to
support the efficient migration flows and outcomes. Rather than use crude regulatory instruments,
which mostly rely on the idea that there is some optimal policy of discrimination, it makes sense
to use the tax system in order to elicit optimal trade-off between labor and leisure, between the
domestic and wider labor markets and between skill acquisition and employment. This is clearly
the first best policy instrument due to the fact that remittances play such a huge motivating reason
for migration and have sizeable macroeconomic and macroeconomic effects. In order to make
more specific proposals, a proper study of the taxation systems would be necessary. Currently,
wiiw is conducting a large study of informal economies in the Balkans and in the Eastern Europe
and the results may prove useful for policy recommendations when it comes to migration too.
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Appendix: Building, Destroying, and Crossing Walls: A Note on the Literature on
Immigration
Introduction
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union did not involve immediate liberalization of
cross-border labour markets, though the expected and indeed the realized immigration was not
dramatic (Zaiceva 2006, Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2008, Kahanec and Zimmermann 2009).
Finland, Greece, Spain and Portugal have decided not to prolong the barriers to labor mobility for
citizens of the new member states of the European Union (EU) from Central and Eastern Europe.
In that they join United Kingdom (UK), Ireland and Sweden that did not impose restrictions to
begin with. The other countries have three more years to keep the barriers on and can extend
them for additional two years afterwards. Most of them have indicated that they intend to soften
the restrictions already and will in all probability lift them off well before the deadline is finally
reached in 2011. At the moment, judging from the public pronouncements, it looks as if only
Austria and Germany will use up the opportunity to restrict access to their labour markets to the
full.
In this context, it is interesting to note the recent assessment by an independent expert
group, the ITEM Club, who have in their Spring Forecast (2006) reached the conclusion that the
overall impact of migration from the new member states of the EU on the UK economy has been
quite positive overall: “As a direct result the UK workforce has become younger, more flexible
and economical, easing the pensions burden and keeping interest rates lower than many
commentators could have predicted. Even with a modest rise in unemployment numbers we are
looking at a very favourable cost-benefit ratio.” Also, migrants “have plugged gaps in a variety of
industries, from agriculture to hospitality and catering with nearly 300,000 immigrants taking
new jobs in the UK in the last 3 years. Unlike previous occasions that have been confined to
major urban centres, this influx has benefited many regions across the UK from East Anglia to
Edinburgh.”12
                                                 
12 See ITEM Club Spring Forecast (2006), pp. 11-16 http://www.ey.com/global/content.nsf/UK/Economic_Outlook.
Quotes are from the press release. Similar assessments can be found in European Commission (2006) and in UK
Home Office at al. (2006). Ser also Doyle, Hughes and Waldesjo (2006), Gilpin et al. (2006), and Anderson et al.
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In the current debates on migration in the EU and in the USA often opposite expectations
are voiced about three of the issues that are deemed to be more important than the others. The
first is that migration is not the same as trade, because of the effects on public finances.13 The
second is that immigrants lower wages and that is especially damaging in the case of low skilled
workers.14 The third is that immigration increases cultural heterogeneity that has all kinds of
negative consequences.15 In this short literature review, these three arguments will be assessed for
their consistency and empirical support.
Voluntary and involuntary migration
To introduce the discussion, a brief conceptual comment may be in order: migration is seen here
as a labour market phenomenon, which means that mostly economic immigration will be
discussed (and effects on the sending countries will be set aside). The empirical research finds
significant differences between the economic and political migrants.16 In the case of the
economic migration there is a voluntary, contractual relationship between the employer and the
employee.17 The behavior of both is guided by the markets and in turn influences developments
in the markets (though it is not the case that markets, e.g. expected wages are the only reason to
migrate or stay, Kahanec and Zaiceva 2008 and Budnik 2009). Thus, the idea, for instance, that
without the restriction on migration from less developed to more developed countries the whole
population of the less developed countries will settle in more developed countries or that there
                                                                                                                                                               
(2006). Though there are differences in the specific findings in these reports, the main massages for the UK and the
EU as a whole are generally in accordance with the findings by the ITEM Club quoted in the text.
13 For the theoretical statement of the difference see Hammond (1993, 1995, 2000) and Hammond and Sempere
(2004a); for typical assessments of the policy implications see Becker (2006), Krugman (2006a). For a detailed
discussion of the appropriate way to study migration from the public finance point of view consult MaCurdy,
Nechyba and Bhattacharya (1998),  For an extensive and influential argument on the public finance effects of
immigration see Sinn (2004a and 2004b). There is of course no lack of those who argue for more protection from
foreign trade too. It is indeed questionable whether it makes sense to free trade and to restrict migration given that
both have effects on labour markets and competitiveness. For the evidence that trade and migration have been
historically treated differently and for the discussion of some of the reasons why this has been so see  Hatton and
Williamson (2005)
14 Krugman (2006a). Krugman (2006b) gives a succinct description of a negative, even nightmare, utopia that is not
often encountered.
15 For an influential statement see Huntington (2004).
16 For a comprehensive treatment see Borjas (2005); for a discussion see Boswell and Crisp (2004).
17 There is a sense in which the employment of illegal immigrants is not voluntary; it can be reasonably argued that
they would prefer legal employment to the illegal one. It makes sense to argue that this type of employment is
involuntary, though no coercion on the part of the employer is actually involved.
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will be no end to immigration into rich countries if there is free movement of labor is inconsistent
with the way markets work.
It is different with political migrations or with refugees. Their resettlement is involuntary
and is not guided primarily by the labor markets. In addition, in many countries, political
immigrants and refugees are treated differently from the economic migrants.18 In general, the
former are often denied market access and may be rather entitled to income support of one kind
or another. As a consequence, their participation in the labour markets is quite different as is their
impact on the public finances. It could be argued that even in their case market solutions are
better than the alternative ones, but that is a separate issue.
The key conceptual difference, to repeat, is whether cross-border migration is seen as a
market or as a political phenomenon. It is to be expected that market induced movements will
give rise to different consequences from those that are pushed by political shocks, though both
are more often than not influenced by both economic and political causes, but those should be
kept distinct conceptually.
Migration and social welfare
Though the effects of migrations on the labour markets are the most important ones, the public
debate has been dominated by the concerns with their effects on the public finance. Especially in
cases where most of the immigrants have been with low skills. Low skilled migrant, it is argued,
is a cost on the budget while high skilled one is a net contributor. The argument is as follows. A
low skilled migrant belongs to the low income group that benefits from the progressive nature of
taxation. Thus, low skilled migrants take out more then they bring in over their lifetime. The
opposite is the case of the high skilled migrant. Therefore, from the public finance point of view,
it is argued, low skilled migrants should be kept out and high skilled ones should be welcomed
in.19
                                                 
18 For a historical overview of laws on citizenship and the way immigrants have been treated consult Bertocchi and
Strozzi (2005).
19 On the public finance issues connected with congestion, see a theoretical discussion in Hammond and Sempere
(2004b). For an argument that applies to a welfare state, such as are those that can be found in the EU, see Sinn
(2004a and 2004b).
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The argument is flawed in all of its forms. In the typical case, the low skilled immigrant is
initially a contributor to the public revenues, because he or she pays taxes immediately and starts
receiving most of the social benefits only later.20 Thus, in the beginning, the immigrant bolsters
rather than endangering the public finances. He or she contributes more, on net basis, than the
native low skilled worker over their whole lifetime, because he or she has not been relying on any
public resources before immigrating. The issue, if there is an issue, then is who is paying for the
benefits that he or she is receiving later in the life, once health services are needed or, for
instance, at retirement? Clearly, to the extent that the tax system is progressive, the better off pay
more than the worse off for whatever is supplied by the public sector. The issue is, however, what
is the opportunity cost of the immigrant as compared to the native worker? Clearly, the
immigrant worker costs less. Even if he or she brings in the family and has children, that is also
the case with the native worker. The only difference is in the duration of the contribution and in
the amount of benefits. As a rule, an immigrant contributes for a longer period of time and draws
less on social benefits overall.21
This may be different in the case of an immigrant who applies for benefits rather than for
work. In most cases, except for political or refugees in general, this is not possible because of the
way the benefits system is set up. Recent studies on migration within the EU, also, find no
evidence of “welfare tourism”, i.e., of people migrating in order to take advantage of target
countries’ welfare systems.22 It is, indeed, true that in some cases the unemployment rate among
the immigrants is higher than among the native population; though most studies find that the
employment rate among the immigrants is actually higher than among the natives.23 In some
cases, e.g., in France, the unemployment among the second generation of immigrants is higher
than among the native youth. This is not the consequence of immigration per se but of the way
the labour market and social discrimination work. Restricting migration would not improve the
                                                 
20 For an extensive argument see Simon (1884, 1989). Theoretical case has been made in a series of papers by Razin
and Sadka (1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2004), Gilpin et al. (2006), Doyle, Hughes and Waldesjo (2006).
21 In Sinn (2004a and 2004b) it is argued that the beneficial effects of immigration on social security contribution can
be found only for immigrants that settle for more then 10 years and especially for those that stay for more than 25
years (and have children). The implication would have to be that incentives for short term immigration should be
removed and long term migration, especially of families with kinds, should be encouraged.
22 See e.g., European Commission (2006).
23 For one study on immigration in and within EU 15 see Peracchi and Dopalo (2006). They find that labour markets
characteristics of long-term immigrants from outside EU 15 converge to those of the natives unlike in the case of
intra-EU 15 where immigrants tend to have lower employment and higher unemployment rates than the natives.
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working of the labour market; in all probability the level of unemployment would remain the
same with or without migration. The distribution, of course, would be different with the natives
being the only ones who would be unemployed if there were no immigrants.
It may seem that an immigrant with larger family would be a burden irrespective of
whether he or she is skilled or not. Over the whole lifetime, and certainly over successive
generations, that is not the case.24 The working force will in fact become younger and will in all
probability lower the burden of social security benefits. That is the case even with the costs of
education and health being taken into consideration because they will be paying for those with
higher earnings that will come with higher human capital that investments in education and
health will bring. Again, to the extent that the tax system is progressive, transfers from rich to
poor will of course remain migration or no migration. Of course, if the educational system
discriminates against the children of the immigrants, they will be a growing burden on the social
security system.
Thus, the argument about low skilled immigration is essentially an argument about the
desirability of progressive taxation. If it is believed that direct or indirect social transfers are not
desirable, than it may make sense to change the systems of taxation and of social benefits, but
that is an argument for and not against migration. For one, because immigrants cost less than the
natives in terms of public finance, and, for another, because once there is no tax or other types of
transfers, there are no reasons to restrict migration, at least not on that account. In addition, the
existing welfare states, with progressive taxation, support permanent rather than guest
immigration. Consequently, they support freer rather than more restricted mobility and they
support legalization of illegal immigrants rather then their repatriation.  Finally, migrant families
are more supportive of the public finances of the recipient countries than the individual migrants.
Why is so much debate on immigration concerned with its effects on the public finances?
Essentially because the investigative motivation of much of this research is muddled and
confused. Competition for employment is seen as a labour market issue, but it is also assumed
that employment is in fact being rationed with natives queuing up ahead of the immigrants. Their
privileged place in the queue is justified on inter alia public finance grounds. Clearly, these are
contradictory assumptions, i.e., market access to and rationing of employment, and that accounts
                                                 
24 There seems to exist a theoretical agreement on that; see Simon (1984), MaCurdy, Nechyba and Bhattacharya
(1998), Razin and Sadka (1999 and 2004) and Sinn (2004a and 2004b) .
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for the stress that is put on consequences of immigration on public financing. This also reveals
that the debate about immigration is really the one about justified inclusions and exclusions.
Wages and competitiveness
Increased supply of low skilled labor, it is argued, depresses the wages of low skilled workers.
That, it is suggested, has an income and an employment effect. In addition, it is sometimes
argued that it has a negative effect on competitiveness. Most of these arguments either do not go
through or are about other aspects of the market system and not really about migration.
The argument about the wages declining due to the competition from the immigrants is no
different from a similar argument that could be made about internal labor mobility. However, it is
mostly argued that internal mobility is beneficial for the efficient allocation of labor unlike cross-
border mobility. In the same manner, it is argued that internal free movement of goods is good,
but imports of cheap products are not. Thus, this is in essence an argument about the market
allocation rather than about migration.
Theoretically, it is argued, if there is full employment and supply of labour is increased,
the wage may be expected to fall. This, however, depends on the assumptions made to justify the
existence of full employment. If, as seems unavoidable on theoretical grounds, it is assumed that
full employment implies that employees and employers are wage takers, i.e., that wages are set
by the market, then an increase of labour supply should not lead to any change in the wages. If
there is no full employment, either migration cannot happen, for lack of demand, or it will push
the wages downwards and thus push the economy in the direction of full employment.
Some empirical analysis, e.g., in Israel, seem to indicate that it may be appropriate to
assume that wages are indeed given in a small open economy. Initially, an inflow of migrants
depresses the wage, but as the return to capital increases, so do investments and wages bounce
back rather quickly. In addition, most studies find that the depressing effect on wages comes
more from trade than from migration.25
It is also argued that a migrant worker displaces a domestic worker thus increasing
unemployment. That makes sense only if the reservation wage of the domestic worker is higher
                                                 
25 For short and long term effects on wages see Borjas (2003 and 2009) and for the effects of trade vs. immigration
on wages see for instance the recent survey of the literature by Hanson (2006).
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than that of the migrant one. If that is the case, the causes that support high reservation wage
should be investigated. That, again, has nothing to do with migration. In fact, research in the US
finds that the effect of the low skilled migrants on the wages of the low skilled native workers is
essentially non-existent, mainly because they are not really perfect substitutes. Indeed, the
difference between the wages of natives, between low and high skilled, seems not to have
changed despite significant increase of immigration in the last few decades.26 In the EU, the
inflow of new immigrants from the Central European new member states has been too low to
have had any discerning influence on the wages in the EU.
Finally, it is argued that low skilled migrants, unlike the high skilled ones, threaten the
competitiveness of the country of destination. Because the country will, it is argued, specialize in
low skilled sectors rather than in high skilled sectors. Thus, USA will look more like Mexico and
the EU will converge to Turkey. This is not supported either by theory or by the evidence. In fact,
low skilled workers are invited to migrate because the developed countries specialize in high
skilled industries. That may create demand for low-skilled labour in services and in other non-
tradable sectors. In the same way, developing countries export high skilled labor because they
specialize in low skilled sectors.
If, however, developed countries were to protect their low skilled workers and keep their
wages higher than they would be with liberalized migration, these countries will either support its
workers to specialize in low skilled labor or will attempt to diversify rather than specialize. In the
latter case, of course, it cannot be that these countries will both attempt to develop all types of
skills and to specialize in the high skilled sectors. In other words, they will either have to give up
the idea of being competitive or will have to choose whether they want to support low skilled
specialization of domestic workers.
The issue of diversity
In view of recent social tensions in immigrant neighborhoods, it is argued that the assimilation
policy in the EU but also in the USA is failing. It is believed that there is significant difference
between earlier migrations and the current ones. The folk theory, now used to criticize certain
                                                 
26 See Card (2005a) and Ottaviano and Peri (2005). For criticism of the latter paper see Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson
(2008).
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version of the idea of multiculturalism, is that in the past immigrants wanted to integrate and to
look as much as possible like the natives, while now they want to preserve their identity and thus
the heterogeneity of the societies in the EU and the USA is increasing. As a consequence, cultural
barriers to immigration, it is argued, should be strengthened (for some limited discussion of the
existence and the importance of various types of cultural barriers, see Sanroma, Ramos, and
Simon 2008 and van Dalen and Henkes 2009).27
Both claims – i.e., that heterogeneity is a problem and that the lack of assimilation leads
to more social conflicts – are not supported by historical and sociological evidence. When it
comes to assimilation, it is hard to argue that current inflow of migrants is not assimilating
because it has been quite recent.28 As for diversity, it is not likely that the identity issues are now
more important than they used to be in the past. In fact, the institutional ability to deal with
diversity is if anything better now than it was the case in the last century. It may perhaps not be
an exaggeration to argue that the international tensions that we observe now used to be internal
tensions in the states and the empires of the past. Indeed, both the US and the EU are now in a
position to take advantage of the increased diversity.
The last statement is predicated on the assumption that diversity is advantages in
economic, social and cultural sense.29 That may sound as a paradox, but that reaction is just an
indication of the confusion that surrounds the discussion of the whole issue of migration. It is true
that managing greater diversity stresses the need for institutional reform and development and
that readiness for institutional reforms may be in short supply nowadays. But that has little to do
with migration and everything to do with the weak political will that characterizes both the US
and the EU at the moment.
                                                 
27 For a detailed account of the history of immigration into the USA see Zolberg (2006). For some reflections on the
economics of the historical evidence on migration see O’Rourke (2004). For an overall assessment of economic
effects of migration both on countries of origin and of destination see Global Economic Prospects (2006).
28 For an influential study see Borjas and Katz (2005). For evidence that new immigrants are assimilating much as
have the previous waves of immigrants into the USA see Card (2005).
29 For some evidence that diversity is indeed beneficial see Ottaviano and Peri (2004).
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Conclusion
The debate on immigration is completely detached from the facts as we know them or could
know them and the inferences about it that are made in the public are hardly consistent. They are
also not supported by economic and social theory, not to mention history because some of the
most developed countries in the world are historically recipients of large inflows of immigrants if
they are not outright products of immigration and colonization.30 Just looking at the bulky facts –
such as unemployment levels, working hours, wages and public finance problems – it is clear that
the main economic characteristics have little if anything to do with immigration both in the US
and in the EU.
In the US, in the period of rapid immigration, unemployment rates have been quite low,
probably not very far from full employment. In the EU, the persistently high unemployment in a
number of countries can hardly be blamed on immigration; it is hard to find a study of this
intriguing macroeconomic fact that relies on immigration flows for an explanation. Similarly, the
decline in effective working hours in most of Europe can hardly be blamed on the growing
competition from the immigrants. As for wages, it is hard to find evidence for negative, and in
most cases of any, effects of immigration on wages.
Similarly, neither public finance nor social problems can be traced to increased
immigration. Immigration, if anything, may have positive effects on the long term sustainability
of the public finances of the aging European and US societies. Internal security as well as the
crime rates do not seem to have worsened in the last few decades and in fact internal security has
most probably improved, in some cases like New York quite dramatically.
It is thus hard to avoid the thought that for some rather embarrassing reasons when it
comes to issues of migration and the clash of civilizations, whatever that might mean, it is
politically correct, even for most vocal advocates of free markets, to advocate building internal
and external walls, the introduction or maintenance of discriminatory legislation and even ethnic
cleansing through deportation.
                                                 
30 For a history of migrations into the USA see Zolberg (2006).
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